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Abstract 
In 2006 the UK government announced a move to zero carbon homes by 2016.  The demand 
posed a major challenge to policy makers and construction professionals entailing a 
protracted process of policy design.  The task of giving content to this target is used to 
explore the role of evidence in the policy process.  Whereas much literature on policy and 
evidence treats evidence as an external input, independent of politics, this paper explores 
the ongoing mutual constitution of both.  Drawing on theories of policy framing and the 
sociology of classification, the account follows the story of a policy for Zero Carbon Homes 
from the parameters and values used to specify the target. Particular attention is given to 
the role of Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) and to the creation of a new policy venue, 
the Zero Carbon Hub.  The analysis underlines the way in which the choices about how to 
model and measure the aims potentially transforms them, the importance of policy venues 
for transparency and the role of RIAs in the authorization of particular definitions.  A more 
transparent, open approach to policy formulation is needed in which the framing of 
evidence is recognized as an integral part of the policy process. 
 
Keywords: building regulations, energy policy, evidence-based policy, net-zero, policy design, policy 
formation, public policy, Regulatory Impact Assessments, zero-carbon 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings called for the 
“the application of minimum requirements on the energy performance of new buildings”; a 
revision of the Directive in 2010 (Directive 2010/31/EU) stated that: “Member States should 
draw up national plans for increasing the number of nearly zero-energy buildings and 
regularly report such plans to the Commission.” The demand was ambitious, but also 
extremely ambiguous.  Since its introduction, member states have struggled to give content 
to the concept.  In Britain, the focus has been on the formulation of a policy for ‘zero carbon 
homes’ from 2016.   
This paper focuses on the process of ‘translating’ the UK target into a set of specific 
objectives.  Whereas much of the literature on evidence and policy depicts evidence as an 
independent, external input, the case of Zero Carbon Homes (ZCHomes) challenges that 
image.  In the case of ZCHomes, the production of evidence was both essential to the 
specification of policy objectives and publicly contested.  To a certain extent, these features 
reflect the unconventional location of the policy process, as evidenced by its displacement 
from ministerial offices to a specially created organisation, the Zero Carbon Hub (ZCHub).  
But it also points to a more general feature of policy formulation. 
From an empirical perspective, the case study poses the questions: “How did the 
definition of zero carbon homes shift over the course of the policy process?” and “How did 
the production of evidence contribute to the definition of the policy problem?”  From a 
theoretical perspective, it challenges the tendency in the policy and Energy Construction 
literature to treat evidence as external and static at the point of use.  In their place, it calls 
for a processual model of the relation between evidence and policy (see below), which pays 
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attention both to the production of evidence and to the “back-and-forthness of policy 
decision making” (Monaghan, 2010, p.43).  In focusing on the content of the evidence, this 
paper complements studies of policy makers use of evidence once policies and associated 
evidence have been finalized (e.g. Simmons, 2015 in this special issue). 
The discussion which follows treats the case of ZCHomes as an “extreme” case.  The 
term comes from case study research and refers to instances of a social phenomenon 
which, while exceptional, may also provide lessons for other cases (Yin, 2009, p.49).  The 
distinctiveness of the policy for ZCHomes lies in the extent to which the initial aims were 
underspecified as well as in the break with the usual policy process.  The paper begins with a 
very brief overview of the literature on evidence and policy and the two theories, policy 
framing and the sociology of classifications, which inform the analysis.  This is followed by 
an account of the specification of the concept of ZCHomes, with a focus on the mutual 
constitution of policy objectives and evidence over time.  The paper concludes with lessons 
for policy making and research into evidence and policy. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Evidence and Policy 
Much of the current research on evidence and policy positions the topic in the 
current political drive for evidence-based policy research (EBPR).  This is evident both in 
political calls for evidence based policy and in trans-national and national requirements for 
Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs).  In the UK, Tony Blair (Prime Minister 1997 - 2007) 
promised to modernize the policy process, privileging ‘what works’; while David Cameron 
(Prime Minister 2010 - 2015) has called for a professionalization of the public sector, using 
evidence to make it a leaner, more efficient operation (Botterill & Hindmoor, 2012; 
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Hallsworth, Parker, & Rutter, 2011).  In parallel, the European Commission and many 
Western governments have mandated the use of RIA’s in the formulation of all new policies.  
Key markers include: US President Ronald Reagan’s executive order 12291 in 1981, the 
European Commission First Impact Assessment Guidelines in 2003 and the UK’s 
implementation of new Impact Assessment guidelines in 2007.  Organizationally, EBPR has 
been supported by the creation of formal networks, research institutes, corporate research 
groups, foundations and governmental organisations (Lenihan, 2013). 
A number of features characterise political and academic discussions of EPBR.  
These include: 1. the depiction of evidence as radically distinct from politics, 2. the 
treatment of evidence as static information which can be adopted or rejected and 3, an 
almost wistful aspiration to transform policy making into an apolitical rational decision 
making process and a concurrent acknowledgement that it is not.  As Ezrahi (1990) and 
Porter (1995) have shown, these assumptions can be traced back to an Enlightenment 
model of politics and are essential to the promise of evidence and data to produce ‘better 
policies’.  They can be seen in the linear models of policy development which populate 
official policy prescriptions (see, for example, the ROAMEF cycle in the UK Treasury's Green 
Book,  Grice, 2011/2003, p.3).  While this view of evidence has been widely criticized (e.g. 
Dunlop, 2010; Head, 2010; Hertin, Turnpenny, et al., 2009), it continues to inform the 
research agenda around policy and evidence in subtle ways.  This can be seen in calls to 
improve the quality of data through new and improved methods and the implicit 
assumption that better knowledge will minimize the gap between policy and outcomes.  
Without contesting these claims, this paper argues that social and political factors are also 
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always present and need to be taken into account in discussions of policies and initiatives 
for the built environment. 
The contribution of ‘processual models’ to the analysis of evidence and policy lies in 
their potential to combine technical, social and political considerations in the study of both 
policy formulation and evidence production.  This approach to the study of evidence and 
policy was suggested by Monhagan (2010) in his work on adversarial policies.  In 
Monhagan’s work, the term ‘processual’ draws attention to the way in which different types 
of evidence are or are not taken into account in the policy process.  This study expands that 
focus to an examination of the co-production of evidence and policy definitions over time. 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to say something about the concept of evidence, or 
rather policy evidence.  Instead of treating evidence as information which is somehow more 
‘true’ or less ‘political’ than other types of knowledge, this paper defines it as knowledge 
produced by a particular set of instruments deployed in a particular set of procedures.  
Evidence producing instruments and procedures include, amongst others, appraisals, 
assessments and consultations.  This working definition limits the scope of the study to 
knowledge explicitly produced for a particular policy process (and to the scientific studies 
which it draws on).  It expands the scope of the study from the use of information to the 
process of its production.  In doing so, it shifts the question from: “How does evidence 
influence policy decisions?” to: “How does the production of evidence overlay and map 
onto the policy process?”  As such it builds on the processual approach identified above, but 
expands it to include the production and content of the knowledge itself.  
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Framing and Classifications 
The analysis of the policy for Zero Carbon Homes which follows is informed by two 
related theoretical literatures: political science work on policy framing and sociology of 
science work on classifications and standards. The concept of ‘policy frames’ points to 
variations in the way that specific policy problems are defined and understood by different 
actors (Rein & Schön, 1996; Schön & Rein, 1995).  The concept has mostly been used to 
analyse conflicts between actors in the policy process.  Policy frames limit the range of 
options which different actors perceive and entertain. They provide the basis for alliances 
and coalitions; similarly they explain the failure of different actors to agree.  For the 
purposes of this paper a focus on framing provides a different way to think about the 
relation of evidence and policy.  Instead of focusing on how policy actors use (or fail to use) 
evidence to make decisions, it draws attention to the relation between the way in which 
policy problems are framed in relevant policy discussions and the way in which they are 
framed in policy evidence. 
The topic of the framing of evidence is addressed by drawing on the sociology of 
classifications (Bowker & Star, 1999).  This branch of the sociology of science and technology 
has developed in the past fifteen years.  Its relevance for this paper lies in the attention 
which it draws to the myriad of decisions which go into the production of data.  These 
include decisions about what to measure as well as what units to use.  Two points are 
relevant for this discussion.  The first concerns the non-giveness or openness of those 
dimensions.  Nothing about energy use dictates that it should be measured in terms physical 
units (kWh), carbon units (kgCO2e/m
2/year) or weather-dependant spending (£/m2).  
Similarly, nothing about energy demand dictates that we should focus on individuals rather 
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than households or buildings or even neighbourhoods.  The choices depend on the 
researcher's and policymaker’s questions and goals as well as on the context in which the 
data is produced and the audiences for whom it is being developed.  By extension, 
classifications never capture everything that is relevant about a particular object and they 
are subject to change.   
The second point concerns the consequences of these choices.  Classifications 
matter because they are associated with different behaviours or ways of acting.  For 
example, UK local authorities treat planning applications differently depending on whether 
the buildings are designated Grade I, Grade II or unlisted - indicators of their cultural / 
architectural significances and level of statutory protection.  
The analysis which follows traces the shifting definition of ZCHomes from the 
perspective of the categories which were used to specify the target.  More specifically, it 
traces: the different parameters and values which were considered at different points in 
time, the issues which led to their proposal and adoption (or rejection) and their circulation 
across different venues and actors.  The aim of the analysis is threefold.  First, it provides a 
particular version of the development of the UK policy for ZCHomes.  As for any set of 
events, there is a near infinite way of telling this story.  The more detailed the account, the 
more complicated it appears.  By focusing on the circulation of categories, the version 
presented herein offers a dynamic, yet schematic account.  This perspective privileges the 
overlay of policy formulation and evidence production.  As such, it necessarily sacrifices 
other important aspects.  No claims are made about individual level motivations or 
understandings; nor does the account address the energy performance implications of 
different definitions of ZCHomes.  The second aim of the story is to explore the contribution 
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of a processual model to current reflections on the relation between evidence and policy.  
Finally, the exceptional and experimental nature of the policy process in this case provides 
an opportunity to reflect on lessons for the future integration of policy making and evidence 
production. 
METHODS 
The research for this paper focuses on the overlay of three distinct but interrelated 
analytic levels.  These include 1. the ongoing interaction between policy actors, interests, 
venues and instruments 2. the ongoing specification of policy aims and 3. the production of 
evidence which accompanied that policy design process.  The first provides a basis to reflect 
on the specificity of the case, and thus the relevance of lessons for other cases.  Following 
the social constructivist assumptions inherent in both theories, it also provides an initial 
insight into how and why certain categories came to dominate the framing of ZCHomes 
(although a full account would require additional research).  The latter two serve to map the 
overlay of policy framing and associated categories in the policy and evidence processes.   
Social constructivism is a phenomenological approach which begins from the 
assumption that existing arrangements are the product of past negotiations between 
people with different knowledge, interests and associated understandings (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966).  In the literature on policy framing, this fundamental premise leads to a 
view of policy frames as the product of ongoing negotiations between actors with different 
interests.  Moreover, it assumes that policy actors’ understandings change as a result of 
engagement with one another.  This position calls for a study of the way in which aims and 
objectives develop over the life of a policy (points one and two above) and the negotiations 
which produce those changes.  Recently, research into the policy process has underlined the 
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role of venues in providing, or precluding, non-traditional actors access to the policy process 
(e.g. Kaunert & Léonard, 2012).  As the discussion which follows indicates, the creation of 
the Zero Carbon Hub involved a displacement of the policy process into a new type of 
venue, thus suggesting the relevance of this analytic concept. 
The sociology of classification adds to this approach a particular interest in 
instruments and the classifications embedded within them.  A central premise of this paper 
is that evidence producing tools, such as consultations and RIAs, play an important role in 
the introduction and legitimation of the parameters (classifications) which frame policy 
problems.  Viewed from this perspective, policy tools provide a novel and potentially 
valuable way to study of policy formulation in particular and governance structures more 
generally (Hood & Margetts, 2007).   
The decision to focus on the development and circulation of formal classifications 
supports the use of documentary analysis.  The approach is widely accepted in policy 
research (see, for example, Harrington & Morgenstern, 2004; Radaelli, 2005); the key 
feature is the use of publicly available documents as primary sources to reconstruct social 
processes.  In the course of the analysis documents (like other primary sources such as 
interview transcriptions or written observations) are subject to critical analysis and 
transformed into processed data.  Within organization studies, research which relies on 
publicly available documents to analyse a particular event is sometimes referred to as 
‘organizational post mortem’ research (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Orton, 1997). 
While documents are often combined with other types of data, they can also be 
used on their own.  This use is particularly appropriate in historical research and in studies 
which focus on public and thus visible processes and outcomes.  In the case of the UK policy 
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for ZCHomes, this approach is appropriate for two reasons.  First, the research aim is to 
trace the circulation of formal (public) classifications, rather than informal processes or 
individual level motivations and understandings.  Secondly, the policy process is this case is 
extremely well documented.  The ZCHub produced an extensive paper trail of progress 
reports, consultation documents and associated information. 
That said, the method dictates the time frame for the study.  As the discussion 
which follows suggests, this paper focuses on the first two phases of the specification of 
ZCHomes.  This is because the third phase was still ongoing at the time of writing, and as 
such, not amenable to this type of analysis.  While this is a limitation in terms of the story, it 
does not compromise the (more limited) empirical contribution or the more general 
reflections on the relation between evidence and policy. 
Changes in the policy process were tracked through the analysis of numerous 
documents issued by relevant policy actors.  These included formal reports issued by the 
Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Office of the Deputy Prime minster (ODPM), 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Department for Trade and 
Industry (DTI), Treasury, UK Green Building Council (UKGBC) and the Zero Carbon Hub 
(ZCHub).  Analysis of evidence production focused primarily on consultation documents and 
the five RIA’s produced in the course of the policy process and more general scientific 
reports which influenced the ongoing definition of zero carbon, most notably the Stern 
Review (2006) and Calcutt Report (2007).  While a study of the various meanings which 
different actors ascribed to these representations would help to explain the content and 
outcome of specific negotiations, this was not the aim of the paper.  In total 87 documents 
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were collected and analysed.  The full list of these 87 documents can be found in an 
Appendix located in a supplementary online file [production editor will provide URL here]. 
DEFINING ZERO CARBON HOMES  
The story of policy formulation for ZCHomes is complex.  The discussion which follows 
presents it from three different perspectives: the policy process, problem definition and 
RIAs.  The first two use a focus on framing and classifications to explore policy design of the 
ZCHome.  The account focuses on the period 2006-2012.  During this period a number of key 
parameters were fixed; at the point of writing, only the issue of how to offset any difference 
between the carbon emissions associated with the physical building and the target 
(currently referred to as ‘allowable solutions’) remains undefined.  The third discussion 
focuses on the role of RIAs in the specification of UK policy for zero carbon homes.  RIA’s are 
the EU and UK government’s preferred instrument for bringing evidence to bear on policy 
design and thus of special interest for this issue.  An examination of their role in the case of 
ZCHomes highlights the role of RIAs not in weighing options (as it usually thought) but in 
authorizing particular categories in the ongoing specification of ZCHomes as a measurable 
target. 
Policy Process: Part 1 
Designing a policy for ZCHomes involved a variety of actors, venues and events.  It 
also involved a number of different types of evidence production, including external reports 
(which were not commissioned for the purposes of this specific policy), commissioned 
reports, Regulatory Impact Assessments, Consultation documents and building level energy 
modelling.  Figure 1 provides a timeline with these events.   
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
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Before providing an overview of this complex process, it is helpful to introduce the 
‘standard’ policy design process.  Two policies leading up to design of a policy for ZCHomes 
serve both to exemplify standard practice and to introduce the main types of policy 
instruments currently in use.  These include the 2006 revisions to the energy section of Part 
L of the Building Regulations and the introduction of the Code for Sustainable Homes (CfSH) 
in 2006.  
In both cases, policy design was marked by the announcement of an upcoming 
change (in the case of Part L) or new policy (in the case of the CfSH) by the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, later replaced by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG)).  The ODPM then commissioned reports and RIAs from in-house expert 
advisory bodies.  These provided the basis for public consultation processes which ran for 
roughly three months.  During this period members of the public and professional 
organizations of all kinds were invited to send in written responses to the questions posed 
in the consultation document.  The ODPM also created a number of industry advisory 
groups to weigh in on the consultation document.  Shortly after the close of the 
consultation period, the government published its responses to the consultation and a full 
RIA.  Roughly one month later a policy statement was issued.  As this account suggests, 
policy design was largely an in-house process and was structured around the collection of 
evidence, followed by an executive decision.  External groups, whether external 
organizations, advisory bodies or people involved in consultation exercises, provided 
‘evidence’ but were not privy to the decision making process. 
Policy design for ZCHomes began with a similar, albeit more drawn out process. The 
problem entered the policy agenda in late 2006 as part of the government’s response to the 
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Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006).  One of the impacts of the review 
was to convince the government (and others) that it was far less costly to act on climate 
change than to do nothing.  Less than a month later, Gordon Brown (in his role as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer) used his pre-budget speech to announce that until 2012 all new zero-
carbon homes built and sold for under £500,000 would be exempt from stamp duty.  He 
also announced that within ten years, all new homes will be “zero carbon”.  While most 
commentators focused on the promised relief from stamp duty, a few noted the 
introduction of a new concept: “zero carbon home”.  Shortly thereafter, the Communities 
Minister, Ruth Kelly, announced a package of green measures including a progressive 
tightening of Building Regulations to ensure that all new homes would be zero carbon by 
2016.  The target anticipated and surpassed the 2010 revision of the EU Directive which 
called for “nearly zero energy homes” by 2021; it also replaced the EU focus on energy with 
a UK focus on carbon.  
As with the revisions to Part L and the CfSH, policy design began with the 
commissioning of expert reports, RIAs on the timetable for moving both Part L and the Code 
to Zero Carbon in 2016 and a consultation entitled: Building a Greener Future: Towards Zero 
Carbon (DCLG, 2006). This was followed by a full (revised) RIA (DCLG, 2007b) and a policy 
statement(TSO, 2008).  The DCLG statement announced that from 2016 all new homes 
would be zero carbon and called for a managed progression to that goal.  As the 
consultation indicated: 
“we need to set a target now for moving to zero carbon housing within 10 years. We 
would propose to achieve this in three steps: moving first, in 2010 to a 25% 
improvement in the energy/carbon performance set in building regulations; then 
second, in 2013, to a 44% improvement; then, finally, in 2016, to zero carbon. Zero 
carbon means that, over a year, the net carbon emissions from energy use in the 
home would be zero.” 
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(DCLG, 2006, p.3) 
As this quote indicates, targets for the achievement of ZCHomes were progressive and 
directly linked to the 2006 Part L of the Building Regulations, which had just been 
introduced.   
This was followed almost immediately by another cycle of policy design around the 
CfSH.  The consultation was entitled: The Future of the Code for Sustainable Homes - Making 
a rating mandatory (2007c).  The aim was to revise the Code to support the transition to 
‘zero carbon homes’ in 2016. This correspondence was clearly illustrated in Table 1, 
included in the consultation document. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
In terms of this story it is important to note first, that until this point the policy 
formulation process remained unchanged and secondly, that code levels were all expressed 
in terms of emission reductions relative to the 2006 Building Regulations, except for code 
level 6 or zero carbon which had yet to be technically defined.  Two issues which were to 
prove contentious in the future included the inclusion of unregulated energy (i.e. energy 
consumed by occupants through cooking, washing and electronic appliances) in the 
specification of carbon/energy levels and the restriction of allowable solutions to renewable 
energy sources that were physically connected to the unit via ‘private wire’. 
Policy Process: Part 2 
In 2008, a new actor entered the scene and the standard practice for evidence 
based policy was disrupted.  The rupture in the policy process began with an independent 
review of the house building industry and its ability to deliver low/zero carbon homes.  The 
Calcutt Review was published in November 2007.  In its chapter on zero carbon, Calcutt 
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argued that the scale and pace of the zero carbon policy exceeded “anything that has been 
achieved, or even attempted, in Europe or (so far as we are aware) anywhere in the world” 
(Calcutt, 2007, p.89).  While it did not explicitly say so, the cost benefit analysis contained in 
the report directly challenged the one produced for the DCLG consultation. Nor should this 
have been surprising given the DCLG’s own acknowledgement that the consultation process 
“showed that there is currently insufficient information available to establish whether the 
cost benefit analysis carried out is reasonable” (DCLG, 2007a, p.64).  
To help the industry meet the challenge of zero carbon, The Calcutt Review called 
for the creation of a “delivery unit” located outside of government to oversee 
implementation of the government's zero carbon homes policy (Calcutt, 2007, p.98).  This 
suggestion led to the creation of a new policy venue: the Zero Carbon Hub.  While it was 
ostensibly established to support policy delivery, the under-specification of the policy goal 
and extreme uncertainty facing the industry involved it in policy design, with consequences 
for both the policy and the policy process.   
The ZCHub brought together representatives from government, industry and civil 
society in an extra-governmental body.  Organisations with representatives included: 
campaigning groups such as the World Wildlife Fund and UKGBC, independent professional 
groups, such as RIBA, LGA, Building Control and Planners, academics, Green Building 
Groups, such as AECB (Association for Environment Conscious Building), Good Homes 
Alliance and the PassivHaus Trust and industry representatives from a variety of different 
roles, including house builders, product manufacturers and consultants.  In addition, the 
ZCHub engaged with a wide range of professional and trade bodies such as the British 
Electro-technical and Allied Manufacturers Association (BEAMA), the House Builders 
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Federation (HBF), Energy Industries Council, Building Controls Alliance (BCA) and Federation 
of Master Builders (FMB).  Finally, the ZCHub had direct government involvement.  Agenda 
items were informed by questions from relevant government departments and most 
meetings were attended by one or more representatives from a relevant ministry.   
The work of the ZCHub was documented in a succession of progress reports, 
consultations and reports, informed by extensive building modelling to support realistic 
policy recommendations and technical advice.  As such it acted as a parallel policy body, 
with its own in-house research capability, but without the authority to issue policy 
decisions.  Between 2008 and 2012, the ZCHub successfully reframed the definition of zero 
carbon.  It did so by shifting the task from a single problem or target to a three part problem 
(represented by a triangle) and by superimposing additional parameters on each part to 
produce a set of commercially and technically viable targets.  The result is that whereas 
other European countries classifies energy targets according to national or household 
interests (such as climatic region), the UK classifies them by an industry-governed logic of 
house types. 
The discussion which follows explores the story of this triangular representation 
(hitherto referred to as ‘the triangle’), the overlay of classifications which constitute it and 
the inclusions, exclusions and path dependencies which it introduced.  A central argument 
in the paper involves the way in which the production of evidence actively affirmed and 
institutionalized those classifications, thereby contributing the the very definition of the 
problem they were supposed to assess. 
Problem definition: classifying zero carbon  
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The first hint of a move towards a three (or at times four) part classification of 
ZCHomes can be found in the Calcutt Review.  As the authors noted: 
Our view is that the best approach is to require the highest practicable standards of 
energy efficiency as a first, not a final, recourse. Ideally, remote generation should 
be taken into account only for discretionary energy uses or on sites where 
distributed energy generation is, for local or environmental reasons, not feasible. 
(Calcutt, 2007, p.93) 
The point was picked up by the UKGBC in their report for the 2016 Task Force, The Definition 
of Zero Carbon (2008).  Over the next year the initial distinction between energy efficiency, 
on-site and off-site mitigation were gradually formalized into a triangular representation.  
The triangle first appeared in the DCLG’s consultation document Definition of zero carbon 
homes and non-domestic buildings in December 2008 as a proposed hierarchy for 
implementing ZCHomes (Figure 2).  It divided the problem into four parts, including: 
• strict energy efficiency parameters – building design and appliances 
• meeting at least a minimum level of carbon mitigation onsite or near-site 
• demonstrably additional offsite low and zero carbon energy solutions  
• contributions (if needed for offsetting) to a Community Energy Fund, whose 
proceeds would be used to fund investment in additional low and zero carbon 
energy.  (DCLG, 2008) 
One point which was to prove controversial was the inclusion of unregulated energy 
in the definition of energy efficiency (as indicated by the inclusion of appliances).  A second 
point of future contention involved the target for carbon compliance.  Carbon compliance in 
this document was defined in terms of a reduction of carbon emissions relative to Part L of 
the 2006 Building Regulations.  This was consistent with original government guidelines, but 
frustrating for the industry, especially after the introduction of revisions to Part L in 2010.   
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In the hands of the ZCHub, the triangle became the basis for a three stages strategy 
both for the definition of ZCHomes (policy design) and for their physical design 
(implementation).  In terms of policy design, the Hub called for a progressive definition of 
zero carbon, starting with energy efficiency and culminating with off-site mitigation.  This 
strategy had two advantages: it allowed policy makers and the ZCHub time to provide more 
solid evidence based data and it began with those areas and problems which house builders 
already understood, namely the selection of building materials and systems. 
Problem definition: the bottom tier 
Starting with bottom tier, the ZCHub’s contribution is nicely summarized in their 
decision to change the name of the category from ‘energy efficiency’ to’ fabric energy 
efficiency’.  This move served to shift the focus from national energy targets to building level 
challenges.  In November 2009 the Zero Carbon Hub published a second report with clear, 
concrete recommendations for a Fabric Energy Efficiency Standard (FEES)(2009b).  A key 
issue for the Hub was the introduction of different targets for different building types.  More 
specifically, they called for different thresholds for detached homes, semi-detached homes 
and apartment buildings.  They also asked for a change in metric, arguing that the 
expression of targets as a % of reduction relative to 2006 regulations was confusing.  The 
report recommended that the minimum FEES should be set at: 39 kWh/m2/yr for apartment 
blocks and mid terrace houses and at 46 kWh/m2/yr for semi detached, end of terrace and 
detached houses. The rates were justified as “challenging but realistic” (ZCH, 2009a, p.10) . 
The ZCH submitted their report on 10 November 2010 to the DCLG; two weeks later 
the Minister of Housing announced a minimum standard for the energy efficiency of ‘zero 
carbon homes’ based on the ZCH’s FEES recommendations.  These were then included in the 
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DCLG consultation on revisions to the CfSH and in July the Minister announced that the FEES 
would be incorporated into the 2013 Part L of the Building Regulations.  This decision 
marked a policy success for the ZCHub and the industry; it also institutionalized both the 
triangle as the accepted approach to the definition and implementation of zero carbon and 
the classification of carbon reduction targets by building type.  
Problem definition: the middle tier 
With the definition of fabric energy efficiency in place, the ZCHub moved onto the 
middle tier of the triangle. Once again, they changed the name to better reflect their 
approach.  The middle tier was renamed ‘low and zero carbon solutions’ and used to refer 
to carbon reduction associated with renewable technologies.  The term ‘carbon compliance’ 
was redefined as the carbon reduction (or rather performance level) to be achieved through 
the bottom two tiers of the triangle (building fabric AND specified renewable technologies) 
(Figure 2).   
A key issue for the ZCHub was the government’s target of 100% reduction through 
carbon compliance.  As the Hub pointed out to its members, this target effectively called for 
150% reduction in carbon emissions relative to 2006 standards (owing to the inclusion of 
unregulated carbon, which was not addressed by Part L) - a level which would require 
dramatic changes to building practices and business models.   
In July 2009 the DCLG conceded the point and issued a policy document identifying 
70% as its preferred option (Healy, 2009).  While the number may seem precise to some, it 
was not an example of evidence based policy.  Instead, the target would seem to have been 
chosen for being somewhere between the 44% target for 2013 (relative to the 2016 
baseline) and zero (an absolute target which was not yet defined but which everyone 
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acknowledged could not be completely covered by the building (carbon compliance) alone.  
Far from resolving definitional problems, the specification of 70% only served to shift the 
problem of policy definition from a definition of the concept of ‘zero carbon homes’ to the 
proportion for carbon compliance. 
<insert Figure 2 around here> 
In February 2011 the ZCH published an interim report, Carbon Compliance - Setting 
an appropriate limit for zero carbon homes (2011b), laying out its recommendations for the 
middle tier of the triangle.  The report rested on: “an extensive exercise in modeling and 
reality checking which indicates the limits of what is generally feasible using today’s 
knowledge of design and technology”(ZCH, 2011b, p.1).  As the following quote indicates, 
the report criticized the government’s target of 70% and offered a more industry - friendly 
series of targets adjusted for housing types.   
On the basis of the technical evidence, the Task Group concluded that the currently 
proposed 70% improvement over 2006 is not deliverable as a national minimum 
standard for all dwellings. It would significantly constrain the range of house types 
(and designs) which could be built and the locations where they could be built. In 
particular, it would inhibit the building of apartments.  
(ZCH, 2010, p.8) 
Instead, the report recommended a range of targets for the ‘built performance’ emissions 
from new homes, by type.  These included: 
• 10 kg CO2e/m
2/year for detached houses 2, 3 
• 11 kg CO2e/m
2/year for other houses (semi-detached, terraced etc) 
• 14 kg CO2e/m
2/year for low rise apartment blocks (ZCH, 2010, p.8). 
The ZCH metrics differed from the DCLG ones in a number of ways.  First, they 
substituted the DCLG’s reliance on performance as designed with performance as built.  
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Secondly they replaced percentage improvement over 2006 baseline with absolute limits on 
carbon emissions, expressed in CO2e/m
2/year.  For policy makers confused by this shift in 
metric and as a point of comparison, the report provided approximate equivalents in a 
footnote.  It noted that, “ in addition to any improvement achieved by moving from 
designed to built performance, the % improvements on the 2006 standard would be 
approximately: 60% for detached houses 56% for other houses 44% for low rise apartment 
blocks (ZCH, 2010, p.11).  As the reader will note, all three targets are below the 
government’s proposed threshold of 70%. 
Moreover, an examination of the modeling used to support the thresholds suggests 
that they were partly linked to assumptions about the technology mix.  Officially, the 
ZCHub’s call for variations in the carbon emissions target by house type was presented as 
neutral with regard to the choice of technology.  In practice, the distinction between 
terraced and non-terraced homes and apartment buildings suggests that computer 
modelling was based on the use of photovoltaic (PV) panel to roof area ratios to assess the 
feasibility of different carbon compliance thresholds (Lees & Sexton, 2013).  In contrast to 
the situation with FEES, where the government adopted the ZCHub’s recommendations 
almost immediately and without amendment, in the case of carbon compliance things 
moved more slowly.  This can partly be ascribed to the change of government in 2010 and 
the new Treasurer Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne’s concern that the aim of 
‘zero carbon’ went too far (Gardiner, 2013; Nichols, 2011; Webb & Harvey, 2011).  However, 
in May 2011, the DCLG published an Impact Statement on zero carbon homes which 
endorsed the ZCH’s recommendations for carbon compliance (DCLG, 2011).  In response, 
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the World Wildlife Foundation resigned from the government’s 2016 Task Force on the 
grounds that it was not longer committed to its own target of zero carbon homes by 2016.  
While the Government would seem to have accepted the ZCHub’s 
recommendations, they were slow to implement them.  In 2013 the Government 
announced the dissolution of the CfSH.  The Zero Carbon Homes policy, however, has 
survived and negotiations are ongoing over the definition of ‘allowable solutions’, the 
stickiest and most problematic of the three tiers (see below).  In a significant victory for the 
Zero Carbon Hub, the Queen’s speech in 2011 announced the Government's intention to 
restrict zero carbon to regulated energy.   
As the discussion above indicates, the definition of zero carbon homes was clearly 
shaped by extensive consultation processes, building level energy modelling exercises and 
expert reports both commissioned and external.  A comparison of these different 
documents points to the changing contours of the problem as different actors, and in 
particular, the ZCHub, structured the problem through the overlay of multiple 
classifications.  These include the initial classification of zero carbon into three (or four) 
parts, the classification of targets for each part by building type and the distinction between 
regulated and unregulated energy.  Within each of these, actors used evidence to develop, 
assign and defend different numerical values for these different parameters.  Strangely 
missing from the story thus far are the multiple RIA’s produced in support of every 
consultation exercise and policy decision.  The discussion turns to a brief investigation of the 
relevance of RIAs and an update on discussions surrounding the specification of allowable 
solutions, before using this case to reflect on the relation of evidence and policy 
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Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Regulatory Impact Assessments are widely used appraisal instruments in Europe 
and Northern America.  Amongst EU countries, Britain has gone the furthest in the 
production of RIAs (Radaelli, 2009 ).  RIA is a microeconomic instrument which serves 
macroeconomic purposes: it multiplies the costs and benefits experienced by an individual 
firm by the total population of firms.  The aim of an RIA is to calculate and compare the cost 
and benefit of the proposed legislation on affected stakeholders.  This is presented in the 
form of a restricted number of options (often three) with the intention of providing policy 
makers with the evidence needed to select between them. 
Far from a recent development, the use of such tools has a long history: since 1966 
UK government departments have been required by law to conduct some form of cost 
benefit assessments (CBA) on all proposed legislation affecting business or the non-profit 
sector (Radaelli, 2009 ).  In addition, government departments are required to publish RIAs.  
In principle, departments are also supposed to provide the public with information on how 
specific calculations are produced; in practice, the complexity and length of many of the 
documents (often exceeding 100 pages) leaves them less than transparent.  While the 
introduction of summary sheets has helped address this problem, the assumptions built into 
the quantification of impacts are generally hidden from immediate view, especially when 
modelling techniques are used. 
For the producers of RIAs, the complexity and uncertainty of policy problems pose a 
central challenge, calling into question the certainty of seemingly precise quantitative 
evidence.  One source of complexity stems from the multiplicity of groups whose costs and 
benefits are assessed.  RIA’s produce data at a number of different levels of aggregation; 
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each of which reflects different actors and interests.  In the case of ZCHomes these included: 
owners, occupiers, house builders and organizations involved in carbon trading.  A second 
source of complexity derives from the multiple time scales across which future costs and 
benefits are projected.  The time frame of RIAs often spans decades, depending on the 
expected effect of the policy or project and the level of discounting applied to its related 
costs and benefits.  This matters because future benefits and cost are weighted less than 
near-present benefits and costs.  In the case of ZCHomes, these varied from 2050 to 2030 
and 2016 – all key dates in the government’s overall strategy for addressing climate change.  
This time frame contrasts sharply with the Zero Carbon Hub’s exclusive focus on delivering 
Zero Carbon Homes by 2016.   
A key consequence of this complexity is the high level of uncertainty surrounding 
the evidential base; RIAs by their nature are replete with assumptions concerning how 
affected stakeholders respond to changes in cost curves, learning costs for new 
technologies, infrastructures of supply and just about everything else.  As such they offer a 
particular type of evidence, based in applied science or expertise of one kind or another but 
informed by future imaginings. 
With these observations in mind, it is interesting to explore the dynamic relation 
between the changing framing of ZCHomes in the policy process and in the government’s 
preferred evidence base, the RIAs.  The research for this paper compared the set of five RIAs 
produced in the course of this process.  The focus of the analysis was on the parameters 
used to define, measure and cost ZCHomes. 
A first observation is that the way that the RIAs measure the societal cost of zero 
carbon at the national level is fairly consistent across the five documents; however the level 
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of disaggregation presented in each document varies considerably.  Some provide little to 
no evidence for the predicted impact on occupants or homebuilders; others go into great 
detail.  This is accompanied by quite significant oscillations in the calculated additional cost 
of a ZCHome.  The 2009 document calculates the overall additional cost per dwelling to 
meet the zero carbon homes target at £7-19,000; this is quite a significant band reflecting 
the extreme uncertainty surrounding the calculations.  The 2011 document sets the overall 
additional cost at £3-8000 (see Table 2) 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
The reasons for the reduction in the overall additional cost per dwelling between 
the 2009 and 2011 RIA are multiple.  They include: 1. a relaxing in the specification of the 
fabric associated with the Hub’s campaign to change the definition and targets for energy 
efficiency (the bottom tier of the triangle); 2. changes in the calculation of electricity carbon 
factors and biomass prices between 2009 and 2011, leading to higher costs associated with 
the status quo (e.g. reliance on grid electricity) and higher benefits of switching to low 
carbon solutions; 3. a shift to a much more optimistic CBA model in 2011, as evidenced by 
an improvement of about £1.8 bn. for the same electricity carbon factors and biomass 
prices; 4. a change in the threshold for carbon compliance (the top of the middle tier of the 
triangle) from its proposed 70% relative to the 2007 Part L regulations (or 6 kg 
CO2/m2/year) to a range of thresholds by type of housing unit, set at 14 for a flat, 11 for 
attached and 10 for detached properties; and 5. the exclusion of unregulated carbon from 
the calculation, as announced in the Queen’s speech in 2011 and incorporated into the 
budget. 
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Turning to more detailed comparisons in the calculation of costs and benefits at the 
level of single housing units, the much greater variation in the costs in 2009 relative to 2011 
also reflect a change in the source of evidence.  In 2009, the DCLG relied on individual 
consultants from a number of large engineering consultancies to provide them with 
information on the relevant parameters of a unit house and its carbon emissions.  
Consultancies varied in how they defined the relevant parameters and in the values 
supplied.  To give but one example, consultancies differed in the assumed averaged number 
of m2 in a standard flat.  This mattered for the RIA authors because an extra 2 m2 of floor 
space leads to an extra 2 m2 of carbon generation.  This difference, multiplied by thirty 
years, multiplied by the estimated number of flats in the UK can be quite significant. 
Returning to the question of the relation between RIA evidence and the policy 
process, the comments above attest to the very strong impact of the shifting configuration 
of actors and venues associated with policy design on the content of government produced 
RIAs.  In 2011 the DCLG would seem to have adopted the Zero Carbon Hubs specifications, 
with around 80% of the models referenced coming from them.  This influence is equally 
evident in the framing of options.  The 2011 RIA presented three options, one of which was 
based directly on the ZCHub’s recommendations and was labelled as the governments 
preferred option. 
If one now asks about the impact of the RIAs on policy design, the answer is more 
difficult to establish. This is in part due to the complexity (discussed above) and in part due 
to the mutual constitution of the ZCHub’s evidence and that contained in the RIA.  The most 
judicious answer is that it is the wrong question.  Scholars of RIAs have spent much time 
seeking to distinguish between different uses of RIAs, including portraying policy-making as 
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rational, power, management and creating images of accountability (Radaelli, 2010).  Most 
studies find that RIAs are rarely consulted in policy making.  However, this observation 
overlooks the extent to which they serve to affirm other types of evidence produced in the 
policy process.  In the case of the ZCHub, this would certainly seem to be the case.  When it 
came to decisions about what should happen in 2016, RIAs would seem to have played an 
important role in authorizing evidence and thereby recommendations coming from the Zero 
Carbon Hub. 
Problem definition: the top tier 
With the bottom and middle tiers of the triangle specified, the ZCHub began to 
apply a now familiar approach to the final top tier of the triangle, labelled ‘allowable 
solutions’.  While this development is outside of the formal scope of this paper – in large 
part because was not yet resolved at the time of writing - a few comments serve to indicate 
the classificatory and definitional issues involved.  As with the lower two tiers, the policy 
formulation process has been marked by the ongoing production of reports (ZCH, 2011a, 
2012, 2013) official consultation documents (DCLG, 2014), RIAs (DCLG, 2013) ,relatively 
transparent public debates organized by the ZCHub and less visible discussions behind 
closed doors. 
Of all the tiers, the one for allowable solutions is the most novel.  The first two tiers 
involved efforts to reduce the demand for energy through changes to the physical building 
and the recovery of energy using low and zero carbon technologies.  As a problem in policy 
formulation, the specification of these tiers involved identifying the technical limitations 
(such as available roof area) and setting an appropriate minimum target that was technically 
and commercially achievable on the dwelling.  Both, it should be noted, are familiar types of 
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problem which the construction industry knows how to address.  Thus while the range of 
possible categories and the level of targets were novel and open, the types of consideration 
deemed relevant were familiar.  In contrast, when it comes to allowable solutions, both the 
definition of the problem and the range of solutions involve a break with existing ways of 
thinking. 
At the core of the concept is the idea that, through allowable solutions, house 
builders will be required to pay for the emissions that they were unable to reduce or 
mitigate through the fabric and technologies.  The concept raises many questions, including: 
“How much to pay (i.e. what should the price of carbon be)?”, “Who to pay (i.e. local 
government, national government, private schemes)?”,“For what (connected/unconnected, 
abatement projects)?” and finally, “What counts as an allowable solution?”  While no final 
decisions have yet been made, a number of categories have begun to emerge.  These 
include: a distinction in the price of carbon between market based, fixed, capped and 
minimum; solutions which are connected vs. non-connected to the physical building; and 
solutions which are prescribed vs those which are not.  Other outstanding decisions include 
things like:  Whether a third party should administer the fund and if so, should it be Local 
Authorities, National Government or a private organization? and distinctions surrounding 
the use of money generated (does it have to create the same amount of carbon abatement 
as that needed to reach the mythical ‘zero’ target on site or can it be fueled into a general 
pot of money)? 
DISCUSSION  
The analysis above began with two empirical questions and two theoretical 
approaches.  The empirical questions concerned the shifting definitions of ZCHomes over 
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the course of the policy process and the role of evidence.  Since 2006, all three terms in the 
concept have undergone extensive redefinition.  The term ‘zero’ has moved from a vague 
aspiration to a % reduction in carbon emissions relative to Part L of the Building Regulations 
to a set of targets expressed in CO2e/m
2/year which vary by the type of house plus 
something called ‘allowable solutions.’  While the latter have yet to be defined, it has been 
decided that they are financial rather than physical solutions which involve some kind of 
carbon offset.  The term carbon has changed units and then been reduced, to become 
regulated carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e).  Finally, the term ‘homes’ has undergone 
numerous re-specifications.  It began as a single physical unit, which included the activities 
of its occupants and anything physically connected to it.  The omission of unregulated 
carbon excluded occupants from the concept, while the financial definition of allowable 
solutions extended its parameters far beyond the physical building or even the site.   
Throughout this process evidence in the form of consultation documents, scientific 
and technical reports and RIAs, figured centrally.  Far from entering into the story as an 
external input, the production of evidence was the primary vehicle by which different actors 
developed their ideas and promoted them.  The DCLG commissioned reports and produced 
RIAs.  The ZCHub engaged a wide variety of stakeholders in extensive collective reflection, 
learning and negotiation over each parameter. 
Theoretically, the discussion demonstrates the contribution of a theory of framing 
and sociology of classifications to the study of policy and evidence. The theory of policy 
framing draws attention to the shifting definitions of the policy problem, namely ZCHomes, 
and the way in which different definitions were developed and promoted by different actors 
in the lengthy process of policy design.  It also points to the importance of policy venues for 
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both the policy process and the evidence production process.  A key shift in the story came 
with the creation of the ZCHub.  The displacement of the policy process from a relatively 
obscure process within the confines of ministerial departments (albeit with external inputs 
from consultations and commissioned reports) to a far more public process had a number of 
effects.  First, it involved a far broader range of stakeholders in policy formulation; secondly, 
it opened to public reflection an otherwise closed process and thirdly, because of this, it 
shifted the focus of stakeholder engagement from observations on a set of already defined 
options to negotiation of the parameters and values which informed them.  The result, in 
this instance, was a more “realistic” policy (in the sense of combining substantive 
commitments to low energy buildings with sensitivity to current commercial constraints).   
Turning to the emerging specification of ZCHomes, the sociology of classifications 
focused attention on the content of the different definitions.  More specifically it pointed to 
the conceptual ‘infrastructure’ which contributed to the selection of parameters and 
assignments of values appearing in the different types of evidence in circulation throughout 
the process.  A basic premise in the sociology of classification is that once authorized, this 
‘topography’ of classifications effectively include and exclude particular things from the 
definition of the problem and set path-dependencies which shape what is imaginable and 
actionable in the definition, design and implementation of the policy problem. 
In the case of the problem of ZCHomes, a number of categories proved to be critical 
in the framing of the problem.  These included: the delineation of the problem into three 
categories and their representation in a triangle.  These included: (fabric) energy efficiency, 
carbon compliance and an, as of yet not fully defined, category for ‘allowable solutions’.  
Once introduced the definitions and boundaries (targets and thresholds) which populated 
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the triangle structured the policy design process and the focus of negotiations.  It also 
privileged a fabric first approach to sustainability, which is consistent with both economists’ 
and the industry’s interest in starting with the ‘low hanging fruit’.   
An examination of those discussions also highlighted the introduction of a number 
of overlapping parameters.  A key dimension was the variation of targets by type of house 
(flats, attached and detached).  As indicated above, this dimension is specific to the UK.  
While the ZCHub is clear that its recommendations were technology neutral, this dimension 
would seem to reflect the industry’s current preference for solar.  As Lees and Sexton(2013) 
have argued, solar is the only technology where the amount of roof space is relevant for the 
definition of zero carbon.  A second parameter framing the discussion involved the 
distinction between regulated and unregulated energy.  The restriction of the definition of 
“carbon” to the latter restricted the industry’s responsibility to aspects of energy use over 
which they have some influence; it also significantly watered down the ambitions of the 
initial proposal.  Finally, the definition of carbon is striking for what was discussed as well as 
what was not discussed.  Nowhere in the documents is embodied carbon even mentioned.   
CONCLUSION 
In closing it is helpful to reflect on the contribution of this paper to the themes of 
the special issue and on the limitations of the study.  The story of ZCHomes as told above 
engages with a number of themes in this special issue, albeit from a slightly different angle 
than that proposed in the initial call.  Relevant issues include: the location of expertise, 
linkages between policy formulation and evidence, ownership of data and the implication of 
all three issues for transparency.  The case suggests the value of extra-governmental 
venues, which bring together ministerial representatives with a range of stakeholders from 
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both industry and civil society.  The significance of the ZCHub can be seen in the comparison 
between the government’s usual consultation exercises and the activities of the Hub.  Most 
consultation processes offer extra-governmental bodies and individuals the opportunity to 
comment on a relatively narrow set of questions, often with a pre-fixed set of options.  In 
contrast, the ZCHub provided (or rather created) an opportunity for multiple stakeholders to 
weigh in on the framing of problem and the parameters informing the policy aims and 
objectives. 
This shift from the use of stakeholder engagement to legitimate an already fixed set 
of policy options to their involvement in the specification of those options provides a 
powerful model both for the design and legitimation of new policies.  Its distinctiveness lies 
in the shift in the role of evidence (and associated options) from an external input to an 
object of negotiation and collective learning.  Finally, when it comes to ownership, the 
example suggests that the crucial issue is not (only): “Who owns the data base”, but (also): 
“Who frames it?” where framing is seen as an ongoing process rather than a one time act.  
In response to the question: “Can the processes and assumptions underpinning selection of 
options be made more transparent?”  The answer this paper offers is yes, but only if the 
focus shifts from the selection of options to their formulation  
When it comes to RIAs, the case of ZCHomes adds to a growing body of evidence 
regarding the frequent irrelevance of these documents for actual policy decisions (Hertin, 
Jordan, et al., 2009; Meuwese, 2008; Torriti & Lofstedt, 2012).  Far from suggesting that this 
type of exercise be eliminated, the analysis highlights the conditions under which RIAs and 
cost benefit analyses may or may not matter.  The closer the parameters framing the policy 
goals are to those figuring in the RIA, the more likely they are to influence policy decisions.  
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In the same way that current views of evidence would benefit from recognition of the 
mutual constitution of policy frames and evidence frames, so too policymakers views of RIAs 
would benefit from greater awareness of the origin and content of key assumptions.  
Finally, it is important to underline the limitations of this study.  As indicated above, 
the paper focuses on one aspect of the evidence-policy relation, namely the circulation of 
categories across policy and evidence frames.  Given the complexity of the case, 
documentary analysis was limited to the policy for ZCHomes in its narrowest sense.  
Documents concerning the parallel and intimately related development of Part L of the 
Building Regulations and the Code for Sustainable Homes (CfSH) were not incorporated into 
the analysis.  This decision, in turn, obscured the relation between policy formulation, 
evidence and implementation.   
The study also focused on the first two tiers of the triangle.  Two considerations 
informed that decision.  First, decisions surrounding these tiers were completed at the time 
of the analysis and thus amenable to documentary analysis.  Secondly, both tiers (fabric and 
renewable technologies) engaged the physical structure of the home and as such, they 
involved “simpler” problems, at least for construction professionals.  The third phase, 
allowable solutions, involves financial and market mechanisms, with the far greater 
openness which this implies. 
A third issue concerns the specificity of this case.  While the case of zero carbon 
homes may be unusual in the initial under-specification of the policy aim, the reliance on 
operational definitions to give content to broader policy goals is not.  Much of the current 
agenda for low carbon and sustainable construction involves highly abstract, ill defined 
goals whose content is specified through the framing of evidence, objectives and even 
 34 
instruments.  In this context, it is worth noting that the national plans sent to the European 
Commission by 28 Member States varied substantially reflecting different levels of 
development of national policies.  The objectives varied based on different definitions of 
(near) Zero Carbon. Thus, while the UK efforts have focused on defining Zero Carbon 
standards, in the Netherlands the objective consists of “zero energy buildings”, in Denmark 
and France “positive energy buildings” and in Germany “climate neutral new buildings”;  
Numerical indicators ranged from 0 kWh/m2 to 220 kWh/m2(ECEEE, 2014; Marszal et al., 
2011; Satori, Napolitano, & Voss, 2012).  
As for the policy process, the case of ZCHomes (and of the ZCHub) is indeed unique; 
but not necessarily irrelevant to reflection on evidence and policy more generally.  One of 
the unintended consequences of a rupture in the standard policy process was to subject 
some of the implicit assumptions in the DCLG’s initial framing of the problem and in the RIAs 
to to critical scrutiny, thereby making them visible.  Far from a posing a problem this would 
seem to be a great achievement.  In terms of lessons learned, the key point is not that policy 
makers need to work harder to produce more objective evidence but rather that they need 
to render it more transparent and bring it more visibly and critically into the policy process, 
recognizing the power of underlying classifications. 
Supplementary files 
Further detailed information containing the Appendix mentioned in this article can 
be found in the online supplementary file at http:// 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1 Policy development timeline for the specification of zero carbon homes 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2 The Zero Carbon Hub’s representation of zero carbon homes  
Source: ZCH (2010)  
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Table 1 
   2010 2013 2016 
Energy/carbon improvement as 
compared to Part L (Building 
Regulations 2006) 
 
25%  
 
44% zero carbon 
Equivalent energy/carbon standard 
in the Code 
Code level 3 Code level 4 Code  level 6 
 
 
Table 1: Correspondence between levels in the Code for Sustainable Homes (CfSH) and 
targets for the progressive move to zero carbon homes 
Source: (DCLG, 2007c, p.10) 
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Table 2 
 2006 part L 
RIA 
2007 Building 
a Greener 
Future RIA 
2009 ZCH RIA 2011 ZCH RIA 2012 part L 
amendment 
RIA  
Overall cost of 
measure per 
home (£) 
15,000 – 
40,000 
15,000 – 
40,000 
7,000 - 
19,000 
3,000 - 8,000 2,200 - 7,500 
Fuel costs 
(p/Kw) 
4.12  7.4  5.23 
Social cost of 
carbon (£ per 
tonne of carbon 
dioxide) 
70 70 50 (non-
traded) + 21 
(traded) = 71 
50 (non-
traded) + 21 
(traded) = 71 
50 (non-
traded) + 21 
(traded) = 71 
Cost of 
allowable 
solutions per 
home (£) 
  1,375 – 2,118 1,375 – 2,118 1,375 – 2,118 
Table 2  Elements of CBA in RIAs on Zero Carbon Homes and Part L of the Building 
Regulations 
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